























Why Mergers Fail  





A number of empirical studies have shown that negative abnormal returns often result 
shortly after a once promising merger is consummated.   There are few consistent explanations, 
however, as to why so many mergers result in such poor performance.  This paper sheds light on 
this issue by examining the effect that structural factors (including market concentration and 
R&D intensity) have on post-merger abnormal returns.  The paper also attempts to assess how 
differences in valuation among bidders, along with the presence of multiple bidders, influence 
the performance of the merged firm.   Our findings show that firm value is positively impacted in 
the first one to three years post merger by acquiring related assets, but that participating in a 
merger wave in these years has a negative influence.  Over longer periods of time these effects 




Why Mergers Fail * 
 
I.  Introduction 
  There is considerable evidence that a large share of acquisitions made in the U.S. are 
unprofitable ex post or that they lead to reorganization and/or divestitures of many of the merged 
assets not long after the merger.  Why does this pattern emerge?  Why is it that the factors that 
originally motivated the merger did not yield the anticipated value? 
To examine why many mergers have failed, it is useful to consider the motives behind the 
acquisition.  Some of the most often cited potential benefits to mergers include operational, 
marketing, and financial synergies (including traditional scale economy rationales), gains in 
market share (and, hopefully, market power), and R&D improvements.   This paper uses a multi-
faceted approach to explore the determinants of merger outcomes, focusing on the key structural 
and valuation factors that drove the companies to merge.   
To analyze merger success and failure, we analyze the abnormal returns to the merged 
company, whereby company returns are compared over a period of time to a market capital-
weighted index of comparable equities.  Abnormal returns are calculated over one, three, and 
five years and are adjusted for the market performance over the specified years.  The sample of 
mergers used in this study is a group that was reviewed by the government for potential antitrust 
violations, most of which were challenged (though eventually consummated) and all of 
*An earlier version of this paper was presented at the International Industrial Organization Conference in Boston, 
April 2011.  We thank John Kwoka for his helpful comments on that draft.  
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which were viewed to be horizontal.   
In addition to assessing the influence of structural factors such as market concentration 
and R&D intensity, this paper also examines the effect of valuation discrepancies on post-merger 
performance.  The inherent uncertainty attached to a firm's market value allows for valuation 
differences between bidders and the owners and management of a target firm.  It has been 
suggested  that acquirers overbid to gain control of another firm, and, therefore, the 
underperformance of a merger can be influenced by the premiums paid.  Acquirers may pay 
overly large premiums due to management’s miscalculation of the value of the target’s intangible 
assets and / or goodwill.  The presence of multiple bidders can also raise the acquisition price; 
this is essentially the “winner’s curse”  discussed by many authors
1
  This paper reviews the  prior financial and economic literature on the factors that 
potentially explain the below average performance of the merged firm.  We then present the data 
used and our regression techniques for assessing the impact that particular  structural and 
valuation factors have on merger performance.   The results then follow, which show significant 
negative average abnormal returns for each period studied with the magnitude of these negative 
abnormal returns generally increasing with the length of time.  The factors influencing the results 
, which claims that 
overvaluation of the auctioned asset is a function of the number of bidders, and the return to the 
winning bidder is inversely related to the uncertainty in the value of the auctioned asset (Boone 
and Mulherin, 2008).  Finally, the merger may have been initiated as part of a pattern or wave of 
consolidation in a particular industry.  Being part of the wave then may impact the price paid and 
post merger performance. 
                                                 
1 An early discussion of this is Wilson (1969).  
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vary somewhat based on the time frame analyzed.  However, we generally find, in both the 
short- and long-run, that merger challenges, merger wave participation, and the role of intangible 
assets matter, while less of an impact arises from HHI and R&D intensity. 
 
II. Previous Empirical Evidence on Merger Outcomes 
  There is a long and multidimensional literature investigating the impacts of mergers and 
acquisitions, with these impacts measured by economists in terms of profit performance, stock 
price indicators, and subsequent pricing patterns.
2
  On the other hand, in their survey article, Jarrell et al. (1988) note that many capital 
market event studies have found substantial returns to stockholders in acquired companies – 
ranging from 19 percent gains during the 1960s to 30 percent or more during the 1970s and 
1980s.  They acknowledge, however, that  returns to acquiring firms were  smaller, but still 
significant, in the 1960s and 1970s before turning negative (though not significantly different 
from zero) in the 1980s.  They also note that studies which have sought to identify explanations 
for returns from mergers and acquisitions have found an increased number of bidders to play a 
  Other performance measures have been 
employed by the management literature.  One of the earliest studies was that of Gort and Hogarty 
(1970), who reported on other findings showing mergers through the 1960s producing neutral 
impacts on firm profitability, losses for acquiring firms, and gains for acquired firms.  Lubatkin 
(1983) reviews major empirical studies on mergers from the 1970s, continuing to find at best 
neutral impacts in general on acquiring firm profitability.   
                                                 
2 In recent years there have been several “merger retrospective” studies, which have focused on the competitive or 
output price effects of mergers – while important for public policy, these studies (some are surveyed in Hunter et al. 




role in increasing target firm returns and lowering acquiring firm returns.  For the most part, 
these studies have focused only on “abnormal” returns –relative to a market return—around a 
short “event window” determined by the announcement of the merger.
3
  Roll (1986) also discusses these results, but focuses on a particular explanation for the 
lack of acquiring firm gains – “hubris”, by which he means that these firms are those whose 
perceived value for the takeover target is in the upper tail of the distribution, in the absence of 
any real synergies due to the acquisition.  What he does not pursue, and what this paper 
addresses in part, are characteristics of mergers which make hubris more or less likely. 
 
Ravenscraft and Scherer  (1989)  looked at an  alternative  –  and intuitively, more 
straightforward  --  measure of merger success:  business unit profitability.  They find that 
acquired companies tended to have been more profitable than average pre-merger – especially 
for smaller firms – consistent with the event study result of abnormal returns to acquired firm 
stockholders.  However, comparing these profits to business unit operating profits post-merger 
suggested, on average, declining profits (though some suggestion that “mergers of equals” fared 
better).   
Gugler et al. (2003), investigating mergers in various countries during the 1980s and 
1990s, use accounting data to compare their post-merger profit performance (through five years 
later) to control groups of firms in the same broad industry group not involved in merger activity.  
They find that  five years post-merger the  most common result is increased profitability but 
reduced sales, with common patterns across countries, consistent with enhanced market power.  
Nevertheless, it remains the case that a substantial share of mergers (for the U.S., the country 
                                                 
3 Jensen (1988) is somewhat more optimistic in interpreting studies, though acknowledges that returns to 
acquiring-firm shareholders on average are roughly zero in mergers, and had declined levels in earlier periods.  
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with the bulk of the sample mergers, 41%) fail to have positive profit impacts.
4
Another explanation of merger outcomes relates to whether the merger was part of an 
industry consolidation that is often referred to as a merger wave.  Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) 
suggested that merger waves are driven by technological or regulatory shocks, which are likely 
to increase the level of uncertainty in the industry; others
 
5
 Roll (1986) believes that merger failure can be attributed  largely to “hubris”  of 
management, a view related to the literature on the winner's curse.  Boone and Mulherin (2008) 
examine 308 major takeovers over the 1989-1999 period “to determine whether winning bidders 
fare worse as the level of competition in a corporate takeover increases and as the uncertainty in 
the value of the target firm rises” (p. 2).  Using SEC (S-4) documents providing information on 
the nature of the bid (auction or negotiated) as well as the numbers of bidders pre-announcement, 
they examine bidder returns – but only in a relatively short window (at longest, up to 4 months 
 have argued that merger waves are 
driven by overvaluation.  Duchin and Schmidt (2010) investigate how merger waves affect stock 
market performance and find that in-wave mergers result in worse performance, which they 
argue is due to poorer firm governance than out-of-wave mergers.  They find that CEO turnover 
is inversely related to  merger performance out-of-wave; this relationship, however, is less 
apparent for mergers occurring in-wave.  The authors argue that the performance risks from a 
failed merger are  lower  because CEOs are then evaluated relative to their peers who were 
engaging in similar mergers. Duchin and Schmidt (2010) also contend that uncertainty is greater 
surrounding in-wave mergers because the high volume of these mergers limits analyst coverage.   
                                                 
4 By type of merger, horizontal mergers are found to be the most likely source of long-term profit gains 
(especially in manufacturing). 
5 See Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004).  
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post-announcement)  –  and also operating income for up to 3 years post-completion of the 
acquisition.  Generally, they do not find evidence in support of a winner’s curse in the market for 
corporate acquisitions.   
In this paper we examine the presence  of multiple bidders, as well as intangible 
asset/sales intensity, and the merger  (deal)  premium  (the excess over market value that the 
acquirer pays to consummate the transaction) to consider whether hubris and/or value uncertainty 
influence post merger performance.  A negative influence of any of these would be consistent 
with the winner’s curse hypothesis, while a positive effect would imply that the bidders had 
insights regarding the value of the target that allowed them to gain from the merger relative to 
other acquirers. 
Another strand of the literature analyzes  the impact that  financial and operational
6
Like Sonenshine (2010), our empirical work examines a set of horizontal mergers that 
 
synergies as well as structural factors, to include market concentration and R&D-intensity, have 
on mergers.  Sonenshine (2010) examined the effect that acquirer R&D-intensity, post merger 
concentration levels, and changes in market concentration, have on the merger premium.  He 
finds acquirer R&D-intensity to have a positive influence on the merger premium, but ex-post 
merger concentration levels to have a negative effect.  He attributes the positive R&D-intensity 
effect to the belief by acquirers that they can better monetize the value of their R&D portfolio 
through a horizontal merger.  The negative effect of  ex post  HHI level,  Sonenshine (2010) 
explains,  implies  that above a certain threshold, the increased benefits to greater market 
concentration are limited.   
                                                 
6 See Slusky and Caves (1991), Fee and Thomas (2004).  
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were investigated by the Justice department for concentration concerns in order to gather 
concentration and other merger information.  We use an event  study framework similar to 
Agrawal (1992), Dimson and Marsh (1986) and Lakinishok and Vermaelen (1990) approach 
whereby  the returns to the merged firm  are compared to those of a market capitalization-
weighted index.   
Using this event study methodology Agrawal (1992)  finds a 10% mean 
underperformance of the  merged company relative to the market index, and attributes this 
difference to either issues unrelated to the merger or to the market being slow to adjust to the 
merger announcement, so the post-merger performance captures part of the acquirers’ stock price 
decline after the merger announcement.  He then points out that  these explanations are 
inconsistent with the market efficiency hypothesis. 
We plan to use a similar approach in determining the one, three year, and five year 
abnormal returns.  By assessing abnormal returns up to five years, we mitigate the influence of 
the change in acquirer value from the merger announcement.  In addition, only acquisitions of 
significant relative size are used, which heightens the impact of the  merger versus other 
unrelated factors. We then assess the effects that key valuation and structural variables have on 
post merger abnormal return stock market performance.   
   
 
III. Data  




7 from 1996 to 2006.  See Table 1 for a list of the mergers.  The commonality in 
these mergers is they were all reviewed and often challenged
8 by the FTC or DOJ for violation 
of the Clayton Act, Section 7b.   Only publicly held, free-standing, North American companies 
were used in order to obtain stock prices and other information on the firm.  In addition, the 
target had to account for at least 10% of the value of the acquirer firm, as the merger has to be 
significant enough to affect the post merger performance.
9
Of the 63 mergers covered, 46 were challenged; 2
nd requests were issued for the other 17 
mergers, but these were  not challenged.  Also,  28  (44%) were considered part of a “merger 
wave”.  Like Harford (2005) and Duchan and Schmidt (2010), we identify a merger wave as 
occurring in those industries in which the number of mergers taking place during a time period is 
at least  95% percent of all mergers occurring in that decade.  Also, following  Duchan and 
Schmidt (2010), we limited a merger wave per industry to a 24 month period and allowed only 
one merger wave per 10 year period (the 1990s and 2000 to 2008).  See Table 2 for a list of 
merger waves.  The industry merger waves in this study occurred in the telecommunications 
(two waves), aerospace, life sciences, oil and gas, and computer hardware/software industries.   
 
Abnormal returns (AR) for each merged company were calculated using the technique 
found in Agrawal et. al. (1992) which is summarized in the following equation, 
                                                 
7 During this eleven year time period, approximately 750 to 800 second requests per the HSR Act were 
issued, and 500 to 550 proposed mergers were publicly challenged by the Department of Justice and FTC.   
8  Challenged mergers refer  to mergers that are publicly disputed by the government after a HSR 2
nd 
request.  In these cases an injunction was sought in federal court to block the merger, though eventually a settlement 
was reached allowing the merger to proceed. 
9Since stock market values fluctuate considerably, inpractice, we generally excluded mergers if the ratio of 
sales between acquirer and acquired firm was lower than 10%.  There were a few exceptions where the acquired 
firm’s sales were limited but its market capitalization was roughly 10% of the value of the acquired firm.  For 
example, Ilex Oncology, which was acquired by Genzyme or Alza, which was acquired by J&J, had limited sales 
but relatively high market capitalization because their R&D-intensity was very high.  
 
9 
(1)    AR = Rit – Rst – (βi– βs)( Rmt – Rft) 
Rit refers to the monthly returns for each merged company from the date of the merger 
announcement.   Rst refers to the returns to the index for the market decile of the merged firm; the 
market decile is based on the market capitalization of the security at the time of the merger.  This 
amount is then adjusted by the risk–adjusted equity market return
10 over the one, three, and five 
year period to account for the influence of the equity market on the post merger return.  The 
equity market return is also adjusted by the Beta of the security (βi) and the decile (βs) to account 
for how they are influenced by the market.  Betas are estimated by regressing 60 month post 
merger returns for the security and market capitalization decile against the market or S&P 500.  
Merged companies in the first and second highest market capitalization decile account for 35% 
and 30% of the data set respectively.
11
Abnormal monthly returns are then summed for 12, 36, and 60 months to obtain 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs).  The first observation for the one, three, and five year 
CARs corresponds to the month of the merger announcement. 
 
(2)  CAR = ∑
n
1
i AR  
For each merger key explanatory variables were gathered. Table 3 shows the frequency 
of mergers by industry (defined by NAICs code) and the average one, three, and five year CARs 
by industry.  We see that the mergers in the telecommunications industry generally had the worst 
returns, while those in the services industry had the best returns. 
                                                 
10 Calculated as the difference between the market (S&P 500) return and the risk-free (30 day Treasury 
Bills) 
11 This data set is slightly more biased toward larger market capitalization than the data set of Agrawal et. 
al. (1992).  Sixty-one percent of their mergers were in the top three deciles.  
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The key structural  variables of interest in this study are R&D intensity  and market 
concentration.  The model employed includes acquirer and target R&D-intensity, each measured 
by R&D expenditures divided by sales for the two years prior to the merger, HHI level, as 
provided in the DOJ or FTC complaint documents, and percentage  of  target firm sales 
contributed by the affected product line.   
Valuation variables for examining the winners curse hypotheses include the presence of 
multiple competitive bidders, intangible asset intensity (divided by sales), and merger premiums.  
Valuation variables also include a fixed effect indicating whether the transaction occurred as part 
of a merger wave.    Merger (deal) premiums -- the amount paid above market price -- were 











The denominator is the market value (MVi) of the target, which is the closing stock price 
multiplied by number of shares outstanding, one month prior to the merger announcement.  The 
announcement date is the day in which the acquisition candidate received its first official bid.
12
Intangible assets include intellectual property, goodwill, and other items that lack 
  
The numerator is the difference between the amount offered for the acquisition (Sm) – brought 
back one month at the rate of change in the S&P 500 to match the timing of MV -- and the 
market value of the stock. 
                                                 
12 In three cases the initial offer was rejected and later a second or third offer was accepted.  In these cases 
the deal premium is calculated as the percent change between the accepted offer and the market value 30 days prior 
to the initial offer, with the accepted offer adjusted for the change in the S&P 500 during that longer period (three 
months in the Boston Scientific/Guidant merger, two months in the Verizon/MCI merger, and six months in the 
Oracle/Peoplesoft case).    
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physical properties but add value to the company.   The ratio used is an average of the two years 
of reported intangible assets divided by the sales immediately prior to the merger. 
Control variables include the deal financing method, which is the percent of the merger 
financed by the acquirer using cash versus its own stock.  Assuming that gains from a merger are 
shared equally by the target and the acquirer, Hamermesh (2003) notes that if the terms of the 
deal involve a stock payment, stockholders of the acquirer and target should receive their pro-
rata benefit from the merger in increased profit, and no or little merger premium should be paid.  
However, if there is a cash offer, then shareholders should receive a premium, so one might see 
differences in the deal premium, based on whether the merger is financed by cash or stock.   
Since we are also controlling for the deal premium in the model, the coefficient for the cash 
variable represents the influence of deal financing beyond any direct effect on the deal premium.   
Control variables also include deal size and the ratio of size (by sales) of the acquirer to 
the target.  Time dummy variables and industry fixed effects were included as well.  Information 
regarding the HHI level was also collected for each merger; in many cases, the weighted average 
of these variables was used as the challenge included many product lines.
13  Information on the 
percent that the challenged product represents of the target’s total sales was also gathered, to 
determine the importance of the product lines to the overall company’s business and the effect 
that this line may have post merger abnormal returns.
14
                                                 
13 Often a merger challenge covered multiple product lines.  In these cases the change in HHI amounts 
were weighted by the percent of the sales that they represent for the target. 





Tables 4 and 5 present summary statistics for the structural and valuation explanatory 
variables respectively.  Table 6 shows information sources for the study.  Table 7 provides a 
description of the variables. 
 
IV. Methodology 
The objective of the study is to shed light on some of the factors that may explain merger 
success or failure.  We used one, three, and five year CARs as shown in equation 2 as our 
measures of merger success.  The significance of the CARs was determined by dividing the 
average one, three, and five year CARs by their standard error.   
Upon obtaining CARs for the three time periods, we regressed these  values agaist  key 
structural, valuation, and control variables as shown in equation 4.   
(4) CARj = β1 + β2lnRDj + β3(lnRDi) + β4ln(HL)m + β5(Comp) +β6ln(IntAi) + β7ln(DPi) + β8Wave+β9[X]+ε . 
In this equation, i references the acquired company, j the acquirer, and m the merger.   The 
first two explanatory variables are the target’s R&D-intensity (RDi) and the acquirer’s R&D-
intensity (RDj)  in logs.  These variables are used to assess whether there are differences in 
merger performance based on either the R&D-intensity of the acquirer or target.
  15
                                                 
15 In addition, we tried using the absolute value of the difference in R&D-intensities between the merging 
firms.  This value was found to be insignificant when it was used as an explanatory variable instead of acquirer or 
target R&D-intensity.  The three variables were not all used in one model due to colinearity. 
  A positive 
coefficient would lend support to the notion that the value of research and development efforts 
grows with increased size and/or concentration since the merging firms are in the same industry.  
From a negative coefficient we can infer that combining R&D efforts reduces value, due to  
 
13 
inefficiencies and/or loss of innovating champions (Hitt et al., 1991).  The third variable, HHI is 
used to assess the influence that the presumed  post-merger market concentration has on 
abnormal returns.  Data on both HHI and change in HHI were gathered, but only one of the 
variables was used because of collinearity between the two variables.
16
The valuation variables of interest are a competitive bidding dummy, intangible asset 
intensity  levels  in logs,  a  merger wave  dummy,  and  the magnitude of the deal  premium.   
Following Boone and Mulherin (2008), we test for the winners curse by using a dummy variable 
with a value of one indicating the presence of multiple bidders or an auction versus zero for a 
negotiated bid.  Based on the literature, we expect lower post-merger returns from an auction 
although it is unclear why a firm would bid more than its view of the target’s intrinsic value.  
The second test of the winners curse as presented by Boone and Mulherin (2008) is the value the 
acquirer places on the target’s intangible assets as a percent of sales (IntA).  This term is a proxy 
for the uncertainty of a firm’s asset value.     
   
Another valuation variable is the deal premium (DP).  Simply put, does the premium used 
to consummate the deal affect the performance of the merged firm?  If perfect information exists 
in the financial  markets  then  the deal premium that a  firm extends  represents the value of 
synergies they see in combining the companies.  Therefore, we might expect to see no impact on 
post-merger performance; however, overbidding might suggest a negative impact.  Finally, we 
use a dummy variable (1=in-wave) to assess whether cumulative abnormal returns are influenced 
by the merger being part of a wave of mergers in the industry. 
                                                 
16 The regression model was run using log HHI level and log change in HHI.  The results were virtually the 
same.  We showed the results in Table 9  using log HHI  because the the R-squared was slightly higher.  
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The control variables (X) include financing (cash versus stock), product overlap
17
 
, deal size, 
and relative deal size (measured by the ratio of acquirer to target sales).   In addition, year effects 
are used whereby a 1 indicates the year of the merger and 0 is placed in all other years.  Also, 
industry effects are used with a 1 showing the presence of the merger in one of the ten industries. 
V. Results 
Table 8 shows the one, three, and five year CARs for monthly returns.  There are four 
fewer observations for five year abnormal returns versus one and three year abnormal returns 
since some of the mergers occurred  in 2006 making five year returns for these mergers 
unavailable.  We see from Table 8 that one, three, and five year CARs are negative and that the 
CARs are increasingly  negative over time.  The three and five year abnormal returns are 
significant to the five and one percent levels respectively.   These findings are fairly consistent 
with previous research.
18
Table 9 shows results for one, three, and five year CARs regressed against the structural, 
valuation, and control variables.  We see that the coefficient for challenged mergers is positive 
and significant for one and three year CARs.  This finding indicates that the firms engaged in 
horizontal mergers challenged by the government (though eventually approved) fared better than 
the other mergers,  perhaps due to the market power achieved (which likely prompted the 
government response).  This effect, however, is not found over the five year period, suggesting 
perhaps that regardless of the market power created through the merger, entry and other changes 
   
                                                 
17 This term refers to the percentage the sales of the challenged product represents of the total sales of the 
acquired company.  This variable indicates the relevance of the product line prompting the government challenge, to 
the overall business of the acquired firm. 
18 See Agrawal (2002) and others.  
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occurring in the industry eventually erode this power.   
It is also interesting to note that log HHI and log product overlap have little impact on 
merger performance,  negative and weakly significant in the one (not quite significant for HHI) 
and three year periods.  To the extent that the government decision to challenge the merger 
depends in part on HHI, much of the positive impact of market concentration may already be 
accounted for by the Challenge variable.  This negative residual impact of HHI (and of product 
overlap) then could occur from combining businesses with significant overlap and high levels of 
duplication between the merging companies.  
We also see in Table 9 that the coefficient for merger wave is negative and significant for 
the one and three year CARs but not for 5-year CARs.   The findings for one and three year 
CARs lends support to the hypothesis that consummating a merger as part of a merger wave 
tends to result in lower returns, perhaps due to the poorer firm governance and/or weaker 
external constraints (via insufficient analyst coverage) when a large group of mergers occurs in 
an industry sector at once – often in response to regulatory or technology shocks. 
Also, the coefficients for the deal premium and the competitive dummy variable are 
negative and significant for one year CARs.  This finding lends support to the winner’s curse 
hypothesis whereby merger performance is negatively impacted by a competitive auction or 
when an acquirer pays  a  higher  premium  relative to the market value to effectuate the 
transaction.  However, the coefficient for the log of intangible assets is positive in the one year 
CAR regression.  This finding could be viewed as counter to the winner’s curse, which 
hypothesizes that firms over pay for hard to value, intangible, assets; an alternate interpretation 




We also created a few interaction terms (between regressors and the challenge dummy) to 
assess the differential impact that the merger challenge combined with key variables has on 
merger performance.  In doing so, we found the joint effect of the deal premium and the merger 
challenge to be positive and significant when regressed against one year CARs.  This finding 
would appear to indicate that increasing merger premiums for challenged mergers signals to 
investors ex ante the potential benefits that may accrue from increased market power and/or 
synergies achieved through the merger.  This effect was observed in the first year after the 
merger, but was not found in the three and five year regression results.  No other interaction 
terms were found to have a significant effect on merger performance, and, therefore, were not 
shown in the results.   
For five year CARs the above effects appear to dissipate, except the value of the firm’s 
intangible assets continues to have a positive effect.  There is also some weak evidence in Table 
9  -  the  negative and significant coefficient for acquirer R&D-intensity  in the 5-year CAR 
equation - that there are detrimental effects to combining R&D efforts,  perhaps due to excessive 
duplication of programs and to underestimating (at time of merger) the difficulties in 
coordinating research activities by the two merging firms.  The lingering, negative effect may 
also be due to the loss of senior R&D staff --“innovation champions” who leave the company 
post merger due to cutbacks in R&D-efforts and disruption of programs, as noted by Hitt et al. 
(1991).  It is interesting to note that the effect is only seen with acquirer’s R&D-intensity as log 
R&D-intensity of the target does not affect the  CARs in any of the series.
19
                                                 
19 It should be noted that none of the industry effects (except for 3-year CARs for the telecommunications 
  Finally, the  
 
17 
coefficient for log deal size is negative and significant for five year  CARs indicating that 
diseconomies may accrue in the long run from large mergers.  It is interesting to note that the 
coefficient for log  sales ratio is not significant in the short or long run indicating that the 
differential size of the merging partners does not impact merger performance. 
  To quickly summarize our main results, in the initial few years after the merger 
key valuation and product–market variables appear to have the greatest influence on post merger 
performance.  Over longer periods of time as evidenced by the 5-year CARs, it is the intangible 
factors as shown by the positive coefficient for intangible assets and the negative coefficients for 
acquirer R&D-intensity that affect firm value.  Also, deal size may have a negative impact on 
merger performance in the long run. 
 
V.  Conclusions   
  This paper examined the determinants of merger failure by considering how abnormal 
returns of merged companies  are impacted by key structural and valuation variables.  Like 
previous work we find that abnormal returns were negative over one, three, and five year 
periods.  Differences appear in the significance of the explanatory variables between the 
one/three year period and five year periods.   In the former, the size of the deal premium and the 
signal of a government challenge influence post-merger abnormal returns, as does participation 
in a merger wave.     We also see that product overlap and the post-merger Herfindahl index have 
a (weak) negative impact.  As a government challenge may be related to both, the interpretation 
of these effects is somewhat unclear. 
                                                                                                                                                             
industry) were significant.  
 
18 
Also, mergers occurring during a merger wave appear to have a negative impact on firm 
value.  This finding implies that firms may overreact to changing regulations or industry shocks 
in pursuing acquisitions, and that both internal and external pre-merger analysis may suffer in 
periods of significant acquisition activity.    For the longer (five year) period it is intangible asset 
intensity along with acquirer R&D-intensity that influences abnormal returns.  The implication 
for firm strategy is that gains in intangible assets may have a longer term positive impact on firm 
value, but significant inefficiencies may arise causing negative long term effects on firm value 
when R&D-intensive firms engage in a large horizontal merger.  Also, we see the effect of the 
merger challenge to dissipate over five year abnormal returns.   
This study examined the determinants of post merger stock market performance.  It is left 
for future research to examine other effects, such as the consumer welfare impacts from higher 
prices and/or innovation impacts from changes in patent and /or R&D intensity.  A more careful 
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Table 1 – List of Mergers 











Chevron  Texaco   $45.00   -34%  -62%  -12% 
Shell  Penzoil   $1.80   -24%  -25%  -28% 
Amgen  Immunex   $16.00   -82%  -80%  -41% 
Allergan  Inamed   $3.30   7%  13%  3% 
Genzyme  Ilex   $0.51   53%  -21%  -10% 
P&G  Gillette   $57.00   -26%  10%  5% 
Boston Scientific  Guidant   $27.00     -69%  -58% 
Pfizer  Pharmacia   $60.00   -101%  -71%  -21% 
Sanofi  Aventis   $58.00   -7%  -12%  -9% 
Teva  Ivax   $7.40   -20%  25%  12% 
BP  Arco   $26.80   -67%  -40%  -13% 
Valero  Ultramar   $6.00   130%  -9%  -6% 
Rohm & Haas  Morton   $4.60   -15%  14%  10% 
Valspar  Lilly   $0.76   -30%  5%  -14% 
JDSU  E-TEK Dynamics   $13.50   -67%  -88%  10% 
Precision Cast  Wyman Gordon   $0.72   78%  76%  -13% 
Astra   Zeneca   $30.50   -53%  -7%  5% 
Penn  Argosy   $2.20   43%  71%  28% 
Dow Chemical  Union Carbide   $13.50   -39%  -23%  -33% 
Oracle  PeopleSoft   $10.30   -8%  28%  -7% 
Tyco  Mallinckrodt   $4.20   -43%  -23%  30% 
United Health  PacifiCare   $8.15     -61%  -25% 
3D Systems  DTM   $0.05   25%  1%  6% 




Technologies   $ 3.5   74%  34%  56% 
Exxon  Mobil   $73.7   -66%  -11%  11% 
SBC  Ameritech   $52.0   -65%  1%  31% 
Suiza  Broughton   $0.12   40%  5%  -28% 
First Data  Concord   $7.0     -43%  -33% 
GA Pacific  Fort James   $11.0   26%  29%  39% 
Verizon  MCI   $8.50   -51%  13%  -20% 
Allied Waste  Browning Ferris   $9.40   -26%  9%  22% 




  Table 1 – List of Mergers (Continued)   












TRW  BDM   $1.01   22%  -25%  -12% 
Watson  Andrx   $1.90     38%  -24% 
Excelon  PJM East   $12.0   -32%  43%  18% 
McClatchy  Knight Ridder   $0.88     -302%  -48% 
Quest  Unilab   $1.60   -41%  -25%  -33% 
Glaxo  Smithkline   $70.0   -97%  -67%  6% 
CBS  American Radio   $1.60   114%  122%  67% 
Conoco  Phillips   $33.00   3%  -19%  -35% 
Thermal Electric  Fisher Scientific   $12.80     61%  6% 
Bell Atlantic  GTE   $51.80   -32%  2%  14% 
Federal Mogul  T&N   $2.40   -233%  -165%  67% 
Provident  Unum   $11.43   -83%  -19%  -39% 
El Paso  Sonat   $6.00   -92%  66%  5% 
Novartis  EON Labs   $2.57   -49%  -4%  6% 
Daimler  Chrysler   $40.00   -96%  -84%  0% 
Boeing  McDonnell Douglas   $13.30   -63%  -33%  -29% 
Anthem  Wellpoint   $14.20   14%  26%  -16% 
Sprint  Nextel   $36.00   -112%  -47%  1% 
Ebay  Paypal   $ 1.50   -21%  33%  44% 
Yellow  Roadway   $1.10   -89%  -19%  7% 
JNJ  Alza   $11.80   -57%  -45%  11% 
Whirlpool  Maytag   $2.60     -7%  9% 
Kimberly   Scott Paper   $9.50   -8%  -13%  5% 
Biogen   Idec   $6.79   14%  -22%  19% 
Millennium   Cor Therapeutics   $2.00   -158%  -95%  -87% 
Adobe   Macromedia   $ 3.40   27%  0%  -1% 
Motorola  General Instruments  $17.00  -62%  -45%  14% 
Juniper  Netscreen  $4.00  -7%  -74%  -21% 
HP  Compaq  $25.00  17%  -29%  39% 
Cisco  Scientific Atlanta  $6.90  -49%  23%  9% 





Table 2.  Merger Waves 
Merger Wave  Time period 
Oil and gas  1998 - 2000 
Life Sciences  2000-2002 
Life Sciences  1997-1999 
Technology  2002-2004 
Telecommunications  1996-1998 
Telecommunications  2004-2006 
Health care  2004-2006 
Aerospace  1997-1999  
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(324110)  6  -20%  -26%  -17% 
General 
Manufacturing
20 10   
(Various) 
-33%  -15%  10% 
Life sciences (325411)  16  -57%  -30%  -8% 
Consumer 
(311111, 325611)  3  7%  8%  -11% 
Hardware/software  
(334111, 334611)  8  1%  -13%  11% 
Chemical processing 
(325110)  2  -27%  -5%  -12% 
Aerospace / Defense 
(336411)  4  -9%  5%  -4% 
Telecommunications 
(517110)  7  -79%  -60%  5% 
Other services
21
10   
(Various)  43%  40%  21% 
Healthcare  3  -48%  -35%  -21% 
Total  63  -28%  -17%  -2% 
                                                 
20 General manufacturing includes automotive, appliances, paints, and building products. 





Table 4.  Post Merger Abnromal Returns  Relative to Structural Variables 
N 
(5 Year return/ 1 & 











HHI Level  
26 / 30  High:  HHI 
Levels>=3,633  -39%  -25%  -3% 
30 / 33  Low:  HHI 
Levels<=3,582  -20%  -9%  -4% 
Acquirer R&D 
Intensity 
14 / 13  High: R&D>=4.2%  -27%  -19%  -6% 
45 /49  Low:  R&D<=4.2%  -30%  -17%  -1% 
Challenge 
43/47  Challenge  -28%  -15%  -2% 
16/16  Not challenge  -33%  -25%  0% 
Total 
   





Table 5.  Post Merger Abnromal Returns  Relative to Valuation Variables 
N 
(5 Year return/ 1 & 












28 / 27  In Wave  -41%  -30%  -11% 
31/ 36  Out of Wave  -19%  -7%  1% 
Cash 
10 /15  Primarily cash 
transaction  -10%  -33%  -8% 
39 /48  Primarily stock 
transaction  -39%  -18%  -2% 
Deal Premiums 
21/23  High Premium>32%  -55%  -13%  2% 
38/40  Low Premium<32%  -19%  -22%  -3% 
Competitive Bid 
5/6  Competitive  7%  -8%  -14% 
54 / 57  Not Competitive  -36%  -23%  -2% 
Intangible Assets 
ratio to sales 
12 / 14  High Premium>25%  -5%  -9%  5% 
47 / 49  Low Premium<25%  -36%  -22%  -2% 
Total 
   





Table 6.  Data Sources 
Source  Use 
Antitrust complaints documents (Federal Trade 
Commission,
22 Department of Justice
23
Listing of challenged mergers, deal sizes, 
change in HHI amounts, and post merger HHI 
levels 
) web sites  
Center for Research and Security Prices (CRSP) 
Monthly stock returns, S&P 500 index 
returns, market capitalization returns, 30-day 
Treasury yield returns   
Press releases 
Merger announcement dates, and deal 
financing,  
Merrill Lynch market cap ratings See 
http://ycharts.com/calculations/rankings/market_cap 
Market capitalization of merged firm for 
abnormal return calculation.   
Standard and Poors’ Compustat Data Base, North 
America – Simplified Financial Extract Report 
Company sales, research and development 
expenses,  
Annual reports for the merging companies in the study 
R&D expenditures, merger information.  and 
sales information to determine challenged 
products as a percent of total sales 
S-4 and press releases  Competitive versus auction bids 
 
  
                                                 
22 See http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/index.shtm for a list of Federal Trade Commission 
cases. 




Table 7.  Variable Descriptions 
Description  Purpose 
Acquirer R&D Intensity 
Average of acquirer R&D expenses 
divided by sales for two years prior to 
the merger 
Examine the synergies and/or 
diseconomies in R&D from the  
merger 
Target R&D Intensity 
Average of target R&D expenses 
divided by sales for two years prior to 
the merger 
Examines the synergies and/or 
diseconomies in R&D from the  of  
merger 
Intangible asset intensity Average of intangible assets divided by 
sales for two years prior to the merger 
Examines the synergies derived 
from acquiring intangible assets as 
well as the potential mis-pricing of 
these assets 
Herfindahl Level 
Weighted Average Herfindahl Level 
projected by the government for the 
affected markets 
Influence of market concentration 
on firm value 
Cash 
Percent of payment to shareholders in 
cash versus acquirer stock 
1 =  All cash, 0 = all stock 
Control variable covering the 
influence of deal financing 
Deal Size  Total value of the transaction to 
include cash, stock, and debt retirement 
Controls for the size of the 
transaction 
Sales Ratio (relative 
deal size) 
Ratio of sales of the acquirer to the 
target 
Control variable covering the 
influence of sales differential size 
in the merging companies 
Product Overlap  Average of challenged product line(s) 
as a percent of target company sales 
Relative importance of the 
challenged product to the target 
Time Dummy Variables 
For 1996 to 2006 
t = 1 merger year 
t = 0, all other years 
Control for year effects 
Industry Dummy 
Variables 
i = 1 for industry 
i = 0, not in industry 




Table 8 – Mean CARs  
    Mean CARs   
  1-year  3-year  5-year 
       
Mean  -1.79%  -17.5%  -29.4% 
       
Standard error  3.5%  7.6%  8.5% 
       
T statistic  -0.51  -2.30**  -3.45*** 
       
Range  -87% to 67%  -3.02% to 1.22%  -2.3 to 1.3% 
       
n           63                      63                          59  
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Table 9 – Effect of Structural and Valuation Variables on Total Abnormal Returns 
Dependent Variable – Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
   One Year  Three Year  Five Year 
Log Acquirer R&D  -0.01  -0.01  -0.07* 
  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Log HHI Level  -0.14  -0.74*  -0.02 
  (0.12)  (0.38)  (0.25) 
Log Target R&D  0.02  0.031  -0.01 
  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.05) 
Log Intangible Assets  0.04*  0.03  0.12** 
  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.05) 
Log Deal Size  -0.03  -0.03  -0.12** 
  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.06) 
Log Sales Ratio  0.04  0.09  0.14 
  (0.05)  (0.10)  (0.12) 
 
Challenge  1.48**  4.99**  0.06 
  (0.64)  (2.17)  (1.53) 
 
Log Product Overlap  -0.08*  -0.26*  -0.01 
  (0.04)  (0.15)  (0.11) 
 
Competitive  -0.24*  -0.04  0.64 
  (0.14)  (0.39)  (0.42) 
Cash  0.08  -0.21  -0.45 
  (0.13)  (0.34)  (0.37) 
Wave  -0.24**  -0.79***  -0.31 
  (0.11)  (0.30)  (0.25) 
Log Deal Premium  -0.14**  -0.01  0.01 
  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.05) 
Challenge*log Deal Premium  0.16**  -0.01  0.02 
  (0.06)  (0.11)  (0.13) 
Time effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  -0.20  -0.07  0.32 
  (0.64)  (1.56)  (1.72) 
   R-squared  .61  .43  .58 
   N  63  63  59 
Notes:  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis;   ***, **, and * denote statistical significance levels of 1%, 5%, 
and 10% respectively; MSE denotes mean squared error. 